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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ILL-PAID CLASSES

The Need of Class Organization--Uses and Dangers of Unions--General Disposition of the Hand-Working Classes 284

POVERTY

The Meaning of Poverty--Personal and General Causes--Poverty in a Prosperous Society Due Chiefly to Maladjustment--Are the Poor the "Unfit"?--Who Is to Blame for Poverty?--Attitude of Society toward the Poor--Fundamental Remedies 290

HOSTILE FEELING BETWEEN CLASSES

Conditions Producing Class Animosity--The Spirit of Service Allays Bitterness--Possible Decrease of the Prestige of Wealth--Probability of a More Communal Spirit in the Use of Wealth--Influence of Settled Rules for Social Opposition--Importance of Face-to-Face Discussion 301

PART V--INSTITUTIONS

INSTITUTIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL

INSTITUTIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL--

Innovation as a Personal Tendency--Innovation and Conservatism as Public Habit--Solidarity--French and Anglo-Saxon Solidarity--Tradition and Convention--Not so Opposite as They Appear--Real Difference, in this Regard, between Modern and Mediaeval Society--Traditionalism and Conventionalism in Modern Life 327

FORMALISM AND DISORGANIZATION

The Nature of Formalism--Its Effect upon Personality--Formalism in Modern Life--Disorganization, "Individualism"--How it Affects the Individual--Relation to Formalism--"Individualism" Implies Defective Sympathy--Contemporary "Individualism"--Restlessness under Discomfort--The Better Aspect of Disorganization 342

DISORGANIZATION: THE FAMILY

Old and New R?gimes in the Family--The Declining Birth-Rate--"Spoiled" Children--The Opening of New Careers to Women--European and American Points of View--Personal Factors in Divorce--Institutional Factors--Conclusion 356

DISORGANIZATION: THE CHURCH

The Psychological View of Religion--The Need of Social Structure--Creeds--Why Symbols Tend to Become Formal--Traits of a Good System of Symbols--Contemporary Need of Religion--Newer Tendencies in the Church 372

DISORGANIZATION: OTHER TRADITIONS

Disorder in the Economic System--In Education--In Higher Culture--In the Fine Arts 383

PART VI--PUBLIC WILL

THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC WILL

Public and Private Will--The Lack of Public Will--Social Wrongs Commonly Not Willed at All 395

GOVERNMENT AS PUBLIC WILL

Government Not the Only Agent of Public Will--The Relative Point of View; Advantages of Government as an Agent--Mechanical Tendency of Government--Characteristics Favorable to Government Activity--Municipal Socialism--Self-Expression the Fundamental Demand of the People--Actual Extension of State Functions 402

SOME PHASES OF THE LARGER WILL

Growing Efficiency of the Intellectual Processes--Organic Idealism--The Larger Morality--Indirect Service--Increasing Simplicity and Flexibility in Social Structure--Public Will Saves Part of the Cost of Change--Human Nature the Guiding Force behind Public Will 411

Index 421

PRIMARY ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATION

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF MIND

MIND AN ORGANIC WHOLE--CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS RELATIONS--DOES SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS COME FIRST? COGITO, ERGO SUM--THE LARGER INTROSPECTION--SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN CHILDREN--PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS.

Mind is an organic whole made up of co?perating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds. No one would think it necessary or reasonable to divide the music into two kinds, that made by the whole and that of particular instruments, and no more are there two kinds of mind, the social mind and the individual mind. When we study the social mind we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations rather than on the narrower ones of ordinary psychology.

The view that all mind acts together in a vital whole from which the individual is never really separate flows naturally from our growing knowledge of heredity and suggestion, which makes it increasingly clear that every thought we have is linked with the thought of our ancestors and associates, and through them with that of society at large. It is also the only view consistent with the general standpoint of modern science, which admits nothing isolate in nature.

The unity of the social mind consists not in agreement but in organization, in the fact of reciprocal influence or causation among its parts, by virtue of which everything that takes place in it is connected with everything else, and so is an outcome of the whole. Whether, like the orchestra, it gives forth harmony may be a matter of dispute, but that its sound, pleasing or otherwise, is the expression of a vital co?peration, cannot well be denied. Certainly everything that I say or think is influenced by what others have said or thought, and, in one way or another, sends out an influence of its own in turn.

In the social mind we may distinguish--very roughly of course--conscious and unconscious relations, the unconscious being those of which we are not aware, which for some reason escape our notice. A great part of the influences at work upon us are of this character: our language, our mechanical arts, our government and other institutions, we derive chiefly from people to whom we are but indirectly and unconsciously related. The larger movements of society--the progress and decadence of nations, institutions and races--have seldom been a matter of consciousness until they were past. And although the growth of social consciousness is perhaps the greatest fact of history, it has still but a narrow and fallible grasp of human life.

Social consciousness, or awareness of society, is inseparable from self-consciousness, because we can hardly think of ourselves excepting with reference to a social group of some sort, or of the group except with reference to ourselves. The two things go together, and what we are really aware of is a more or less complex personal or social whole, of which now the particular, now the general, aspect is emphasized.

In general, then, most of our reflective consciousness, of our wide-awake state of mind, is social consciousness, because a sense of our relation to other persons, or of other persons to one another, can hardly fail to be a part of it. Self and society are twin-born, we know one as immediately as we know the other, and the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion.

This view, which seems to me quite simple and in accord with common-sense, is not the one most commonly held, for psychologists and even sociologists are still much infected with the idea that self-consciousness is in some way primary, and antecedent to social consciousness, which must be derived by some recondite process of combination or elimination. I venture, therefore, to give some further exposition of it, based in part on first-hand observation of the growth of social ideas in children.

From our point of view this reasoning is unsatisfactory in two essential respects. In the first place it seems to imply that "I"-consciousness is a part of all consciousness, when, in fact, it belongs only to a rather advanced stage of development. In the second it is one-sided or "individualistic" in asserting the personal or "I" aspect to the exclusion of the social or "we" aspect, which is equally original with it.

Introspection is essential to psychological or social insight, but the introspection of Descartes was, in this instance, a limited, almost abnormal, sort of introspection--that of a self-absorbed philosopher doing his best to isolate himself from other people and from all simple and natural conditions of life. The mind into which he looked was in a highly technical state, not likely to give him a just view of human consciousness in general.

Introspection is of a larger sort in our day. There is a world of things in the mind worth looking at, and the modern psychologist, instead of fixing his attention wholly on an extreme form of speculative self-consciousness, puts his mind through an infinite variety of experiences, intellectual and emotional, simple and complex, normal and abnormal, sociable and private, recording in each case what he sees in it. He does this by subjecting it to suggestions or incitements of various kinds, which awaken the activities he desires to study.

This I conceive to be the principal method of the social psychologist.

One thing which this broader introspection reveals is that the "I"-consciousness does not explicitly appear until the child is, say, about two years old, and that when it does appear it comes in inseparable conjunction with the consciousness of other persons and of those relations which make up a social group. It is in fact simply one phase of a body of personal thought which is self-consciousness in one aspect and social consciousness in another.

The mental experience of a new-born child is probably a mere stream of impressions, which may be regarded as being individual, in being differentiated from any other stream, or as social, in being an undoubted product of inheritance and suggestion from human life at large; but is not aware either of itself or of society.

Very soon, however, the mind begins to discriminate personal impressions and to become both na?vely self-conscious and na?vely conscious of society; that is, the child is aware, in an unreflective way, of a group and of his own special relation to it. He does not say "I" nor does he name his mother, his sister or his nurse, but he has images and feelings out of which these ideas will grow. Later comes the more reflective consciousness which names both himself and other people, and brings a fuller perception of the relations which constitute the unity of this small world.

But, it may be said, this very consciousness that you are considering is after all located in a particular person, and so are all similar consciousnesses, so that what we see, if we take an objective view of the matter, is merely an aggregate of individuals, however social those individuals may be. Common-sense, most people think, assures us that the separate person is the primary fact of life.

If so, is it not because common-sense has been trained by custom to look at one aspect of things and not another? Common-sense, moderately informed, assures us that the individual has his being only as part of a whole. What does not come by heredity comes by communication and intercourse; and the more closely we look the more apparent it is that separateness is an illusion of the eye and community the inner truth. "Social organism," using the term in no abstruse sense but merely to mean a vital unity in human life, is a fact as obvious to enlightened common-sense as individuality.

I do not question that the individual is a differentiated centre of psychical life, having a world of his own into which no other individual can fully enter; living in a stream of thought in which there is nothing quite like that in any other stream, neither his "I," nor his "you," nor his "we," nor even any material object; all, probably, as they exist for him, have something unique about them. But this uniqueness is no more apparent and verifiable than the fact--not at all inconsistent with it--that he is in the fullest sense member of a whole, appearing such not only to scientific observation but also to his own untrained consciousness.

There is then no mystery about social consciousness. The view that there is something recondite about it and that it must be dug for with metaphysics and drawn forth from the depths of speculation, springs from a failure to grasp adequately the social nature of all higher consciousness. What we need in this connection is only a better seeing and understanding of rather ordinary and familiar facts.

In a congenial family life, for example, there may be a public consciousness which brings all the important thoughts and feelings of the members into such a living and co?perative whole. In the mind of each member, also, this same thing exists as a social consciousness embracing a vivid sense of the personal traits and modes of thought and feeling of the other members. And, finally, quite inseparable from all this, is each one's consciousness of himself, which is largely a direct reflection of the ideas about himself he attributes to the others, and is directly or indirectly altogether a product of social life. Thus all consciousness hangs together, and the distinctions are chiefly based on point of view.

The unity of public opinion, like all vital unity, is one not of agreement but of organization, of interaction and mutual influence. It is true that a certain underlying likeness of nature is necessary in order that minds may influence one another and so co?perate in forming a vital whole, but identity, even in the simplest process, is unnecessary and probably impossible. The consciousness of the American House of Representatives, for example, is by no means limited to the common views, if there are any, shared by its members, but embraces the whole consciousness of every member so far as this deals with the activity of the House. It would be a poor conception of the whole which left out the opposition, or even one dissentient individual. That all minds are different is a condition, not an obstacle, to the unity that consists in a differentiated and co?perative life.

Here is another illustration of what is meant by individual and collective aspects of social consciousness. Some of us possess a good many books relating to social questions of the day. Each of these books, considered by itself, is the expression of a particular social consciousness; the author has cleared up his ideas as well as he can and printed them. But a library of such books expresses social consciousness in a larger sense; it speaks for the epoch. And certainly no one who reads the books will doubt that they form a whole, whatever their differences. The radical and the reactionist are clearly part of the same general situation.

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