Read Ebook: The works of the Rev. John Wesley Vol. 06 (of 32) by Wesley John

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Thus says he, "Natural religion takes in all those duties which flow from the reason and the nature of things."? That is, natural religion takes in all those things that bare human reason can discover from the nature of things. This is granted; but what follows? Why, says he, "Consequently, was there an instituted religion which differs from that of nature, its precepts must be arbitrary, as not founded on the nature and reason of things, but depending on mere will and pleasure, otherwise it would be the same with natural religion."?

? Page 114.

? Page 16.

? "expresly" replaced with "expressly" for consistency

? First address to the inhabitants of London, Page 57.

Either therefore there is nothing in the work of the creation, whose fitness and expedience cannot be proved; nothing in God's providence over whole nations, and particular persons, whose fitness and expedience cannot be explained and justified by human reason, or else neither creation nor providence can be ascribed to God.

I appeal therefore to the miracles and prophecies on which Christianity is founded, as a sufficient proof, that it is a divine revelation. And shall here consider, what is objected against the sufficiency of this kind of proof.

But though miracles cannot prove false to be true, or bad to be good; yet they may prove, that we ought to receive such doctrines, both as true and good, which we could not know to be true and good without such miracles. Not because the miracles have any influence upon the things revealed, but because they are God's testimony to the truth of that which he reveals.

But our author brings a farther objection against this use of miracles.

? "opperation" replaced with "operation"

For every reason for ascribing the creation to God, is the same reason for ascribing such miracles and prophecies to God; and every argument against the certainty of those miracles and prophecies coming from God, is the same argument against the certainty of the creation's being the work of God; for there cannot be more or less certainty in one case than in the other.

Either therefore it must be said, that there are, or may be miracles, which cannot be the effects of evil spirits; or else nothing that is ordinary and common can be a proof of the operation of God. For if nothing miraculous can be an undeniable proof of God's action, nothing created can be a proof of it.

? "were" replaced with "where"

To give you one instance more of this writer's extravagant and inconsistent notions.

To return: I have from a consideration of the state of man, and the several relations which God stands in towards his creatures, shewn that it is utterly impossible for human reason to be a competent judge of the fitness, or unfitness, of all that God may, or may not require of us. The two following chapters shall state the nature and perfection of reason, as it is a faculty, or principle of action in human nature.

It appears from what has been said, that every man's own reason is his only principle of action, and that he must judge according to it, whether he receives, or rejects revelation.

It is not my intention by this to signify, that there is not a good and evil, right and wrong founded in the nature of things: but only to shew, that we find out this right and wrong, not by any inward strength, that our natural reason of itself affords, but by such external means, as people are taught articulate language, or the rules of civil life.

Men do not prefer virtue to vice, from a philosophical contemplation of the fitness of the one, and the unfitness of the other; but because it is a judgment as early in their minds, as their knowledge of the words, virtue and vice.

And it can no more be reasonably affirmed, that our knowledge of God and divine things, our opinions of the excellency of this, or that virtue, and of the immortality of our souls, are the effects of our natural light; than it can be reasonably affirmed, that our living in society, and our articulate language are owing to the light of nature.

For, as all mankind find themselves in this state before any reasoning about it; as education, and human authority have taught us language, and accustomed us to the rules and manners of a social life: so education, and the same authority, have planted in our minds, certain notions of God and divine things, and formed us to a belief of our soul's immortality, and the expectation of another life.

And mankind are no more left to find out a God, or the fitness of virtue, by their own reason, than they are left by their own reason, to find out who are their parents, to find out the fitness of speaking an articulate language.

This gentleman, speaking of education, saith, "Education is justly esteemed a second nature; and its force is so strong, that few can wholly shake off its prejudices, even in things unreasonable and unnatural."

? Page 243.

Again: If education has this force of nature even in things unreasonable and unnatural; if it is also absolutely necessary for all men to come under the power of some second nature; what can be more vain, than to pretend to state the light, or rectitude of human nature, since it must be for the most part in every man, as the uncertainty, variety, happiness or unhappiness of education has rendered it?

And our author can no more tell, what man would be without education, or what nature would do for those who had no foreign instruction, than he can tell what sort of beings dwell in the moon. And yet he that does not know this, how can he know what the light of nature is in itself?

May not therefore one justly wonder, what it is that could lead any people into an imagination of the absolute perfection of human reason? There seems no more in the state of mankind, to betray a man into this fancy, than to persuade him, that the reason of infants is absolutely perfect. For sense and experience, are as full and strong a proof against one, as against the other.

Their objection against revelation is founded upon the pretended sufficiency and perfection of human reason, to teach all men all that is wise, and holy, and divine, in religion. But how do they prove this perfection of human reason? Do they appeal to mankind as proofs of it? Do they produce any body of men in this or any other age, that without any assistance from revelation, have attained to this perfection of religious knowledge? This is not so much as pretended to; the history of such men is entirely wanting. And yet the want of such a fact as this, has even the force of demonstration against this pretended sufficiency of natural reason.

Because it is a matter not capable of any other kind of proof, but must be admitted as certainly true, or rejected as certainly false, according as fact and experience bear witness for or against it.

For he that asserts the sufficiency of reason, to guide men in matters of religion, is not only without any positive proof from experience on his side, but has the history of all ages, for near six thousand years, fully demonstrating the quite contrary.

Now this is exactly the case of these gentlemen: their opinion has neither more or less absurdity in it: they only affirm such a sufficiency of reason to be natural to all men, as cannot be supported by a single instance of any one man, that ever lived, and is fully contradicted by the experience and history of every age since the creation of the world.

Our author himself seems sensible, that the argument drawn from facts and experience, pressed hard upon his cause; and therefore has given the best answer to it, he can yet think of.

The justness of this assertion will fully appear by the following illustration.

"It cannot be imputed to any defect in the health and soundness of man's natural constitution, that the world has, in all ages, been over-run with distempers; but to their being entirely governed by physicians, who pretended to I know not what secret knowledge of medicines, which they imposed upon the sickly, as infallible remedies."

? Page 3.

? Page 37.

But how came it, that they ran into senseless traditions? What was it that admitted these traditions as just and good? Why, it was that faculty which judges of every thing, and which this writer recommends as an unerring guide. And to say, a man's superstition is not owing to any defect or weakness of his reason, but to his admitting senseless traditions, is as vain, as to say, a man's false reasoning is not owing to any weakness of his reason, but to his proceeding upon foolish and absurd arguments.

He proceeds thus: "It is certainly no good argument against the sufficiency of the divine light of nature, that men could not err, except they left it, and followed vain traditions."?

? Second Address, page 39.

Besides, how is it that men leave their reason? Why, just as ignorant men leave their knowledge; as dull people leave their wit, or cowards leave their courage. The first part of this paragraph tells you of a sufficiency of the divine light of nature: well; What has this divine light of nature done? What sufficient effects has it had? Why, it has covered all the world with darkness.

And the different degrees of reason are in men, as the different degrees of love and aversion; as the different degrees of wit, parts, good nature, or ill nature, are in man.

And as all men have naturally more or less of these qualities, so all men have naturally more or less reason: and the bulk of mankind are as different in reason, as they are in these qualities.

As love is the same passion in all men, yet is infinitely different; as hatred is the same passion in all men, yet with infinite differences; so reason is the same faculty in all men, yet with infinite differences.

And as our passions not only make us different from other men, but frequently and almost daily different from ourselves, loving and hating under great inconstancy; so our reason is not only different from the reason of other men, but is often different from itself; by a strange inconstancy, setting up first one opinion, and then another.

For it is as much the reason of man that acts in all these tempers, and makes them to be just what they are, as it is the reason of man that demonstrates a mathematical proposition.

And the tempers and passions of a child, differ only from the tempers and passions of a man, as the reason of a child differs from the reason of man.

So that our passions and tempers, are the natural real effects of our reason, and have no qualities, either good or bad, but such as are to be imputed to it.

So that the state of reason in human life, is nothing else but the state of human tempers and passions; and right reason in morality, is nothing else but right love, and right aversion.

So that if any thing can be said of love, aversion, good nature, or ill nature, as common to mankind; the same may be said of reason, as common to mankind.

For whether any thing be fit to be done, it is as he says, "reason alone which must judge; as the eye is the sole judge of what is visible, the ear of what is audible, so reason of what is reasonable."

Every thing therefore that is done, every thing that is chosen in human life before any thing else, is as strictly chosen by reason, as every thing that is seen, is seen by the eye; and every thing that is heard, is heard by the ear.

These forms of speech are very intelligible and useful, and give great life and ornament to all discourses upon morality.

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